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Federalizing Death
GEORGE KANNARt

There almost surely is a study somewhere-probably in USA
Today-purportingto show that the person whom most Americans
hold responsible for reinstituting the federal death penalty is CNN
newscaste Bernard Shaw. At the very least, we do owe it to Shaw
that the federal death penalty's potential as a powerful national
"wedge issue" became so permanently and unmistakably clear."
Before Michael Dukakis imploded, in the face of Shaw's question
at the 1988 presidential debate, the federal death penalty had
seemed pretty much irrelevant both to crime and to politics, even
among people who were not of particularly good will.
During the preceding Presidential election in 1984, this writer
was actually the apparatchik in the Mondale-Ferraro Issues section
who carried that campaign's portfolio on crime. And though the
truth is no doubt recorded somewhere in the ancient campaign
notes that I just threw out three weeks ago, and notwithstanding
some serious recollection-searching in the meantime, I cannot for
the life of me recall what our position on the federal death penalty
was, or whether we even had one. Our concern that year-or our
candidate's concern, anyway-was with a variety of high-tech ideas
for trying to stop drugs from coming into the United States. All of
these ideas were basically preposterous-schemes that involved
sending up huge flights of AWACs to patrol all kinds of places,
tethering gigantic radar-equipped dirigibles at key trans-shipment
"choke points" between various Caribbean islands, and the like.
But nobody, as far as I can remember, paid any attention at all to
the idea of federalizing, or rather re-federalizing, the death penalty. As a potential solution to the problem of crime, re-instituting
the federal death penalty was thought to be even more far-fetched
t Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. B.A., 1970,
Yale University; J.D., 1977, Harvard Law School. Major debts are owed to Patrick H.
NeMoyer and William J. Hochul for their encouragement and support in the preparation of
this article. An even greater debt is owed to Charles Carbone for his indispensable research
assistance. As usual, however, the greatest debt is owed to Henry Schwrzschild (1925-1996),
Director Emeritus of the A.C.L.U. Capital Punishment Project, who provided encouragement, research assistance-and a life-long example of what conscientious action means.
1. The PresidentialDebate; Transcript of the Second Debate Between Bush and
Dukakis, N.Y. Tnsns, Oct. 14, 1988, at A14; Roger Simon, Death Penalty Question Was
Death Knell for Dukakis, SEATTL TimEs, Nov. 6, 1990, at Fl.
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than Mr. Mondale's blimps were.
Re-federalizing was necessary of course, because-according to
Coyne and Entzeroth, 2 whose work is the basic source for a great
deal of what follows here-only one of the several federal death
penalties on the books before Furman v. Georgias was decided had
been re-enacted, with the necessary modifications, after Furman
came down.
The rest had become what Coyne and Entzeroth call
"zombie" 4 statutes: on the books, but generally conceded to be unenforceable. 5 The federal sector's Great Awakening with respect to
the death penalty issue only started when unabashedly oppositionist Governors of New York started getting prominently mentioned
for Presidents, and when primary voter-courting Governors of
Massachusetts started publicly announcing, in early 1988, that
they were "card-carrying members" of the ACLU.7
Everybody knows, at least in general terms, what followed. In
1988, Congress hastily established a new federal death penalty for
drug "king-pins" implicated in drug-related murders.8 As numerous courts 9 and commentators 0 have pointed out, the Congress's
haste was evidenced most obviously in the fact that it neglected to
include in the 1988 statute anything at all about the actual time,
place, method, and manner for carrying out federal death
sentences. 1 That election-year Congress's interest in the death
penalty was purely and transparently symbolic, almost aesthetically so, and not remotely practical. Either inadvertently or pur2. RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1994).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 2, at 683.
5. Id.
6. Red Herring?,WASH. TIsMS, Nov. 24, 1991, at A4; 1988 Legislative and Administrative Message A Union of Individuals, 24 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 91 (Jan. 25, 1988); New
York on the Brink, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1989, at D6.
7. Marie Cocco, et. al, Smears and Fears:the '88 Campaign, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6, 1988, at
4 (reporting statement of Governor Dukakis).
8. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4382 (1988).
9. United States v. Pitera, 795 F. Supp. 546, 569-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v.
Cooper, 754 F. Supp. 617, 627 (N.D. ill. 1990), af'd, 19 F.3d 1154 (7th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1095-96 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2724
(1994).
10. See, e.g., Sandra D. Jordan, Death for Drug Related Killings: Revival of the Federal Death Penalty, 67 Cm.-KENr. L. REv. 79, 92 (1991); FederalDeath Penalty Legislation, 45 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 617 (June 1990).
11. The Congress delegated all that boring, non-symbolic work, in a manner so broad as
to raise its own questions as to constitutionality, to someone else, to develop the real-world
details through regulations, or Executive orders-or whatever. Cf. Loving v. United States,
41 M.J. 213 (1994), aff'd, 1996 WL 287732 (U.S. 1996).
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posely,1 2 the 1988 bill also listed an element of the underlying offense as an "aggravating circumstance" for consideration in the
sentencing phase, which is a pretty sure way of guaranteeing that
at least one "aggravating circumstance" is going to be found in
every case in which a conviction is returned.' 3
Members of the Bush Administration, after proclaiming
throughout the 1988 campaign that they would fulfill the "king
pin" statute's mandate if it was the last thing that they ever did,
essentially accomplished exactly that precise feat.14 In no apparent
rush once the 1988 campaign was over-following due deliberation,
the regular notice-and-comment procedure, the 1992 election, and
virtually the entire post-election transition period-the Bush Justice Department issued regulations 5 designed to fill in the "kingpin" 6 statute's gaps regarding death sentence implementation on
January 19, 1993-the very last day before Bill Clinton assumed
office.' 7 As of May, 1995, prosecutions invoking the capital sentencing provisions of the 1988 drug "king-pin" law had been approved in 46 cases, or at a rate of about 6 or 7 a year.' 8 One of
those was here in the Western District of New York, where a request for the death penalty ultimately was withdrawn in the context of a plea agreement.'" Earlier this year, two federal capital
convictions under this law were actually returned in Binghamton,
N.Y., in the Northern District,2 0 but the sentencing phase jury re12. One senator acknowledged that a particular "aggravating factor" had wound up in
the bill because he "just thought of it, on the spur of the moment," and felt that it was
"pretty good." 134 CONG. Rc. S7491 (1988) (statement of Senator D'Amato) cited in Jordan, supra note 10, at 92 n.60.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (1994). See also Daniel R. Harris, Capital Sentencing after Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat from the "Death is Different" Doctrine from other Penalties, 40
AM. U. L. REV. 1389 (1991); Jordan, supra note 10, at 104.
14. Bud Newman, General News, UPI, Oct. 14, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file; Gordon Peterson, et. al., Inside Washington, Special Reports, Federal News

Service, Sept. 11, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW fie.
15. 28 C.F.R. §§ 26.1-26.5 (1995). The proposed rule (Atty. Gen. Order No. 1634-92) is

set forth at 57 Fed. Reg. 56536 (1992), while the final rule (Atty. Gen. Order No. 1655-93) is
set forth at 58 Fed. Reg. 4898 (1993).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
17. That the Bush Administration waited until its very last day has been widely noted,
including in Jason Vest, The Federal Execution Rush, PROGRESSIVE, May 1995, at 20.
18. Richard Barbieri, Bombing Suspect's Legal Defense in Limbo, THE RECORDER, May
2, 1995, at 1.
19. United States v. Johnson, No. 92-CR-159 (W.D.N.Y. 1995). See also Dan Herbeck,
Plea Bargain Will Spare Gang Killer Death Penalty, BUFF. NEws, Jan. 10, 1995, at B1.
20. United States v. Walker, No. 94-CR-328 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). See also In a DeathPenalty Trial, 2 Are Convicted of a Killing, N.Y. TIsS, Jan. 18, 1996, at B6; John Caher,

State May Send Pairto Federal Death Row, THE TIMms UNION (Albany), Jan. 18, 1996, at
Ai.
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ported back non-unanimously (11-1 in favor) with respect to im-

posing death.2 1
The real "federalizing death" extravaganza took place not in
1988, however, but just prior to the 1994 election, in connection
with the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, effective in September of that year.2" The 1994 Act was passed in such
a typically calm and deliberative Congressional election year environment that the expert commentators still find it difficult to agree
even on such ordinarily easy questions as the exact number of the
federal crimes that had the death penalty attached to them by that
bill-their consensus seeming to be something in the neighborhood
of sixty.23 Among the federal offenses newly recognized-and made
capital when they result in death-are drive-by shootings 24 , something that seems to amount to old-fashioned, sea-faring piracy 25,
and the apparently altogether new offense of "Violence Against
Maritime Fixed Platforms," 2 -whose
exceptionally lengthy
criminalization required Congress to define what a "maritime fixed
platform"27 is' 28(apparently, an offshore oil rig), and also the "continental shelf."
Significantly, with respect to the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City in April, 1995, death also was established as
a potential penalty for the use of a weapon of mass destruction
against federal property in instances where death results. 29 Carjacking, which had only been made a federal crime in 1993, was
one of that slightly unclear number of pre-existing crimes to which
the 1994 Act added a capital penalty. 0 Kidnapping 1 and espio8 quasinage 3 -the latter, in particular, a leading post-Furman$
21. Two Receive Life Sentences in Drug-Related Slaying, BuFF. N.ws, July 23, 1996,

at A6.
22. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994).
23. Mary C. Michenfelder, Federal CarjackingStatute: To Be or Not to Be? An Analysis of the Proprietyof 18 U.S.C. 2119, 39 ST.Louis L.J. 1009, 1020 (1995); see Vest, supra
note 17; Mark L Pinsky, Will Clinton Again Oppose Executions? Old Pal Says Maybe, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1995, at A5.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994).

25. 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (1994).
26.
27.
28.
29.

18 U.S.C. § 2281 (1994).
Id. § 2281(d).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2332(a) (1994); John Parker, Bomb Suspects Attack Indictment: Law-

yers for Nichols, McVeigh Call Some Charges Illogical, Cm. Tam., Oct. 1, 1995, at C16.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994) (originally part of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (1992)).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994); see generally CoYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 2.

32. 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
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"zombie" statute-had an updated death penalty explicitly
restored.
Out of all of this, what we apparently now have, as of June 21,
1996, according to a usually reliable source, is ten people who have
been sentenced in federal court to die;" a new federal lethal injection death chamber in Terre Haute, Indiana, costing something
like $300-$400,000;s" and a new fifty-cell federal death row.36 The
1988 "king-pin" statute, for all its faults, has been treated rather
kindly by the courts,37 and the Supreme Court, in June 1994, declined to review a capital appeal arising under it.s It does not ap-

pear, however, that an actual federal execution in that case-or in
any other-is imminent. When, and if, a federal execution eventually occurs, it will be the first since 1963 s", and it will not take
place against a particularly extensive historical background: the
San FranciscoExaminer reports that in the 36 years between 1927
and 1963, "the federal government executed 34 people."'4 0 And the

ten federal capital verdicts obtained since 1988 are, to put it
mildly, vastly outnumbered by those returned during the same pe-

riod in the states."
33. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
34. All Things Considered: Unabomber Suspect Remanded to Sacramento For Trial
(National Public Radio broadcast, June 21, 1996).
35. See W. Zachary Malinowski, 5 R.L Murder Suspects May Face Death Penalty,
Atty. Gen. Reno to Decide What Penalty to Seek, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 19, 1996, at
Al.
36. Vest, supra note 17, at 20.
37. Lower courts have consistently concluded that the statute is constitutionally viable
despite Fifth and Eight Amendment challenges that claimed the statutory and non-statutory aggravating circumstances were ill-defined and constitutionally vague, and that the
statute fails to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. See, e.g., United
States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Fores, 63 F.3d 1342 (5th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Perry, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20462 (D.C. Jan. 11, 1994); United
States v. Tidwell, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19153 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1995).
38. See Chandler v. United States, 999 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct.2724 (1994).
39. The author of the final appellate ruling convicting Feguer to death was Circuit
Judge Harry Blackmun, Jr. Feguer v. U.S., 302 F.2d. 214 (8th. Cir. 1962). Commentators
have compared Blackmun's opinion in the Feguer case to his later repudiation of the death
penalty. See, e.g., Randall Coyne, Marking the Progressof a Humane Justice;Harry Blackmun's Death Penalty Epiphany, 43 KAN.L. REV. 367 (1995); Michael Mello, Adhering to
Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshalland the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 F.
ST. U. L. Rv.592, 596-97 (1995).
40. David Barstow, Death Central, VA.: Eastern DistrictProsecutors Have Pursued
the Death Penalty with More Zeal than Anywhere Else in the Country, S.F. EXAmineR,
Sept. 4, 1994, at B10.
41. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, there were, as of February,
1996, 2,800 state inmates to 8 federal death row inmates. See Malinowski, supra note 35;
Vest, supra note 17, at 20.
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Whether the animus motivating United States v. Lopez4 2-the Court's possible new concern for the over-extension of
federal criminal jurisdiction with respect to federalizing
crimes-will have any bearing on its evaluation of the 1994 Act's
penalty provisions is only one of the open questions, 43 and not one
where the lower courts' rulings regarding the more loosely-drafted
1988 bill suggest any great grounds for optimism on the part of
44 If the crimes go, obviously,
anyone interested in challenging it.
the penalties will go, too; but it hardly seems likely that they all
will. More likely indeed is that some of the more exotic of the new
capital crimes will go untested because they will also go unused.
Because the 1994 bill does contain specific procedures concerning
the penalty's implementation-which will be discussed in more detail below 45-one of the more powerful arguments against the 1988
bill would at least seem to have been addressed. Whatever else it
may have been up to, the 1994 Congress seems at least to have
been trying to draft a constitutionally valid law containing a usable death penalty.
Perhaps the most significant feature of the 1994 Act, from a
strictly legal point of view, is the one just mentioned-that it actually spells out the manner in which a federal death sentence is to
be implemented, a matter left completely unaddressed by the 1988
"king-pin" bill.46 The Bush Administration's 1993 "Midnight Regulations ' 47 on the same subject, which attempted to plug the holes
in the 1988 Act administratively, have thus seemingly assumed a
"zombie" status of their own. Those Bush-era regulations had provided that federal death sentences were to be implemented via lethal injection at a federal penal or correctional institution48 (hence,
the Terre Haute chamber); that a United States Marshall was to
be the executioner"; and that setting the exact date and place of
execution in a particular case would be left up to the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons.50
The 1994 bill's changes on these points are actually quite dramatic, and in this very concrete respect, the 1994 law federalizing
42. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).

43. See Joseph P. DiVincenzo, The FederalDeath Penalty and CurrentFederalism, 33
CT. REv. 20 (1996).

44. See sources cited supra note 9.
45. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
46. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1967 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3596 (1994)).
47. 28 C.F.R. §§ 26.1-26.5.
48. Id. § 26.3(2).
49. Id. § 26.3(3).
50. Id. § 26.3(1).
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the death penalty rather clearly also defederalizes the federallyordered deaths themselves. 51 Instead of automatically turning the
job over to the new federal lethal injection chamber in Indiana, the
1994 legislation directs the Marshal to "supervise implementation
of the sentence in the manner prescribed by the law of the State
in which the sentence is imposed. ' 52 If the federal death sentence

is handed down in a state that does not have the death penalty,
the court will "designate another State, the law of which does provide for the implementation of a sentence of death, '53 and have
the prisoner executed in accordance with the law prevailing
there." The statute authorizes (and, between the lines, plainly
seems to encourage) the Marshal to "use appropriate state or local
facilities, 55 hire the local executioner (or "a person such an official" usually employs),5 s and send the executioner's bill (... a new
Norman Mailer project there, perhaps ... ) to the Attorney Gen-

eral.57 How the court is to select the alternative state, when a federal death sentence comes down in a non-death penalty state, is
not suggested, much less specified.5 8
But the provision in the 1994 Act that may be the most intriguing-the one that may raise the largest and most meaningful
new questions-is the next, and essentially final, one in that portion of the 1994 bill establishing federal death penalty implementation procedures.5 9 That section provides:
No employee of any state department of corrections, the United States De-

partment of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, or the United States
Marshals Service... shall be required ... to be in attendance at or to
participate in any prosecution or execution under this section if such participation is contrary to the moral or religious convictions of the employee.6 '

And what this section plainly represents is an attempt to establish
something like a conscientious objector status for federal employ51. Id. §§ 26.1-26.5. The proposed rule (Atty. Gen. Order No. 1634 - 92) is set forth at
57 Fed. Reg. 56536 (1992), while the final rule (Atty.Gen. Order No. 1655 - 93) is set forth at
58 Fed. Reg. 4898 (1993).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3596(a) (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3597(a) (1994).
56. Id.
57. Id.

58. 18 U.S.C. § 3596(a).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3597(b).
60. Id. It continues: "In this subsection, 'participation in executions' includes personal
preparation of the condemned individual and the apparatus used for execution and supervision of the activities of other personnel in carrying out such activities." Id.
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ees vis a vis the new federal death penalty.
The evolution of this rather broad exception-whose actual
legislative history, despite a considerable research effort under-

taken by the most skilled mind and hands, 1 is still almost completely obscure-proceeded through a minimum of three distinct
stages. First is the 1988 drug "king-pin" legislation, which established, in a section with the rather punitive-sounding title "Refusal
to participate by State and Federal correction employees," 6 2 that

such employees could not in fact be punished for exercising their
consciences; that they could not be required, as a condition of their
employment, "to be in attendance at or to participate in an execution" in violation of their "moral or religious convictions."63
The second version of the conscientious objector exemption-contained in the Bush Administration's 1993 Department of

Justice regulations"-expanded this concept a little further, seemingly in response to the mountain of commentary that the Depart-

ment had received from medical professionals, and the major medical associations, following the release of the Administration's

original proposed rules.6 5 In addition to exempting correctional
staff from compulsory participation on moral and religious
grounds, the final Bush Regulations also exempted from compul61. This effort consisted of a typically devoted full-court working of the abolitionist
telephone network, cheerfully and unhesitatingly undertaken by the late Henry Schwarzschild, on essentially no notice, and under the most difficult of personal conditions. See Eric
Pace, Henry Schwarzschild, 70, Opponent of Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1996, at
B8 (reviewing life of Jewish refugee from Hitler's Germany who became a Freedom Rider,
aide to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the "leading architect" of the National Coalition to
Abolish the Death Penalty).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 848(r).
63. Id.
64. 28 C.F.R. § 26.
65. The Federal Bureau of Prisons received twenty-odd comments concerning the proposed rule from such organizations and persons as: The National Commission on Correctional Health Care, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Copley Memorial Hospital,
Kim Thorburn MD, American College of Physicians, American Medical Association, Law
Offices of Cohn and Marks, ACLU - National Prison Project, and Southwestern Medical
Center (unpublished letters on file with author). Certain comments expressed the legal and
ethical dilemmas presented to health professionals who have an affirmative duty to protect
life. Others suggested that the presence of a medical professional lended a false aura of
humaneness to the killing process. The American Medical Association specifically noted the
problems that arise when inmates do not die immediately, and the medical staff may have
to specifically indicate what amount of which drug or what amount of electricity would
cause death. Further, prison officials themselves commented that forced participation might
upset the appearance that officials are simply carrying out a task that has been imposed on
them. For a detailed discussion of physicians' professional ethics and physician involvement
with executions, see AMERicAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANs, ET AL., BREACH OF TRUST: PHYSICIAN
PARTinidoN IN EXECUTIONS IN THE UNIrED STATES (1994).
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sory attendance at, or participation in, an execution any employee
"who is a medical professional who considers such attendance or
participation contrary to medical ethics." 66 The Bush regulations
thus formally recognized what amounts to an additional potentially-exempted class. Conscientious non-participant status is
made available by those regulations not just to people whose personal moral or religious beliefs would be offended by participation.
It is extended as well to those who-to take the most extreme
case-despite favoring participation personally, nonetheless felt
precluded from involvement by formal professional commitments-that is, by perceived ethical duties attaching strictly to
their social role, provided only that they personally believe them67
selves bound by those formal professional commitments.
Upon first reading all this in the federal regulations, of course,
one's head simply spins: who could possibly expect to find such
profound stuff, such subtle religious, moral, ethical and social distinction-drawing, lurking in the C.F.R.? Who ever would have
thought that President Bush's last Attorney General, William
Barr, was made of such philosophically sophisticated, morally finespun stuff? And who ever would,have thought (or, for that matter,
thinks) that Congress-more amazingly still-would actually have
noticed that Barr had woven another exception in?
And yet the fact of the matter is that Congress indeed just
might have noticed. The 1994 bill's "conscientious objector" provision-that is, the third and latest version of it-differs from its
predecessors in two significant and substantial ways. For one thing,
it ignores the Bush Administration's special deference to the medical professions per se;65 it omits the categorical, role-based ethical
objection to participation in an execution recognized by the earlier
regulations. Under the 1994 bill's version of the "conscientious objector" section, strictly professional ethical imperatives against
participating in these processes might be overridable, in cases
where those formal role-based ethical imperatives do not also re66. 28 C.F.R. § 26.5.

67. Michael Distelhorst, Judging Ourselves as Heirs to the Realist Insight: The Role of
Ethics as a Bridge Between Law and Life, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 43 (1991) (seeking a "bridge"
between the structure and order of law and the ethics and values contained in legal principles); Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 Omo ST. L.J. 551 (1991) (describing the role differentiation between client representation and the ethical obligations of law-

yers as citizens in the promotion of fairness and justice); Gerald Postema, Moral
Responsibility in ProfessionalEthics, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 63 (1980) (offering an alternative
view of lawyers' perspective on the relationships between clients and their personal morals);
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5 HuMA RaIHTs 1, 23
(1975) (arguing that moral neutrality forces lawyers to adopt a strategy of detachment).
68. 28 C.F.R. § 26.
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flect the employee's personal moral or religious beliefs.0

But, second, and much more importantly, the 1994 bill vastly
expands the overall reach and scope of the exception. In the 1994
version, it is no longer just "correctional personnel" whose moral
and religious commitments are respected; the Marshals and the
Department of Justice also are brought in. Even more significantly,
that to which one may object is enormously enlarged. The current,
1994 exception extends to attending or participating in any "prosecution or execution.

' 70

The federal "conscientious objector" excep-

tion is thus no longer merely about the pulling of the lever, or the
insertion of the poisonous IV, or-something about which medical
professionals have been especially concerned-the process of determining whether death has actually occurred. It is not just about
being in the death chamber any more. It is about being in the office or being in the courtroom.
This broad new exception, which extends all the way through
the U.S. Attorneys' office, and all the way up the Department of
Justice chain of command, perhaps sends a little bit of a message
that the practice of law is to be seen as having at least some modicum of real moral content. 1 With respect to the practice of
medicine, of course, this notion is well known: legal exceptions
from being compelled to perform abortions are familiar;72 an exception from having to terminate the treatment of a patient who
has requested it is part of New York law.78 But there is now also a
legal "procedure" that otherwise responsible government employees can, for similar reasons of conscience, simply decline to do.
What does this new exception amount to? Operationally
speaking, probably not too much. No remotely humane, or even
competent, prosecutorial manager would want staff members in his
or her office handling high profile, capital cases against their better
judgment or their deeply-held beliefs. There is no need to antagonize or to demoralize what must, more or less by hypothesis, be
some of one's better personnel, by trying to force them to handle
69. Interestingly, the law on conscientious objection to military service specifically excludes such moral grounds. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1994). The Supreme Court also distinguishes between moral and religious grounds of objection. See, e.g., West Virginia St. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (an inquiry into the sincerity of a student's religious
objection to the pledge of allegiance was unwarranted); Sicerella v. United States, 348 U.S.
385 (1955) (distinguishing between religious and moral views on conscientious objection to
military service).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3597(b).
71. See generally DAViD LuSAN,LAwYERs ON JUSTIcE: AN ETICAL STUDY (1988); DAVID
LuBAN, THE GOOD LAwYER: LAwYER's ROLES AND LAWYER'S ETHICS (1984).

72. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1994).
73. N.Y. Pun. HI.TH LAW § 2984(3) (McKinney 1994).
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such cases.
But conceptually-that is, in effect, politically-this quiet recognition of the death penalty's continuing moral problems, especially among prosecutorially-minded members of the legal profession, may represent a lot. For one thing, it may send a signal that
at least once in awhile the Congress still remembers just what kind
of issue this really is. And it also introduces a kind of moral symmetry into-creates another moral wrinkle on-the American system of capital punishment as a whole: a potential juror with strict
moral or religious scruples against the death penalty can be prevented from participating in society's decisions regarding whether
to impose it. 4 And a federal government official with similar convictions can now voluntarily opt out.
The truth of course is that, even with this new exception, not
all government officials really can "opt out." The current Attorney
General has been quite forthright about her personal opposition to
the death penalty.7 5 And yet, as Dade County's chief prosecutor,
she is said to have approved something like 100 capital prosecutions. 7 e As Attorney General, it is similarly asserted that, as of September, 1995, she had never rejected a single recommendation that
the death penalty be sought in any particular federal case when
such a recommendation had made it through the Department of
Justice's capital case-screening process. 7 7 But the fact of the matter is that only a very few of us are in any position to be seriously
judgmental. The truly uncompromising abolitionist, the one who
really wishes "not to be involved" in all of this, is going to have to
find a minor party candidate to support for President in the 1996
campaign. And anyone who does not do so is engaging in precisely
the same kind of moral calculus-the trade-off between adhering
to personal principle, at the price of effectively withdrawing from
meaningful participation in our public life-as that presumably
engaged in by the Attorney General.
The idea that public officials might opt out of the death penalty process of course also brings this discussion back to the death
penalty in New York. Since the New York statute was enacted, we
have all seen different efforts by different public officials person74. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
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ally opposed to the death penalty, trying to accommodate their
convictions-and sometimes rather obviously to evade-what appears to be the intention of that law.7 8 As of March 2, 1996, we had
observed the different public play given to two different decisions
not to seek to have the death penalty imposed. The District Attorney for one New York City borough took a stand early on against
imposing the death penalty as a matter of principle, and took considerable public heat when he subsequently declined to seek the
penalty in a celebrated case.79 A different borough's District Attorney's opposition to the death penalty was a little more ambiguously phrased. That District Attorney found, upon close factual examination, that another recent celebrated case, arising in his
borough, failed to present an occasion where seeking the penalty
was appropriate-and even supporters of the death penalty thereupon praised his circumspect professionalism.8
What this focus on moral responsibility in the 1994 crime bill
shows-this ongoing process of reformulation and expansion of the
"conscientious objector" exception that these three different versions of it serve to illustrate-is just how much even the proponents of the death penalty recognize that the question of capital
punishment is one of those bells that, in moral terms, unfortunately tolls for us all. Those same otherwise enthusiastic proponents of capital punishment also perhaps show, through these provisions, just the slightest little trace of shame. How many other
policy areas exist in which the statute establishing the policy also
explicitly recognizes that many well-meaning, well-educated citizens-in fact, full-time prosecutors and prison guards, for heaven's
sake-are going to regard that policy not just as mistaken, but
immoral?
At the same time, it is also true that what this broadened exception may actually accomplish is merely to insure that the federal death penalty is ever more vigorously applied, ever more frequently sought-and also ever more frequently obtained, especially
when one remembers the specifically "death qualified" juries.8 1 To
paraphrase the old anti-gun control bumper sticker: if death penalty objectors all exit (or are caused to leave) the process, only that
78. Adam Nossiter, Balking Prosecutors:A Door Opens to Death Row Challenges, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, § 1, at 27.

79. Jan Hoffman, News Analysis: Death PenaltyRaises Issue of Obligationto Prosecutor, N.Y. TnmnS, Mar. 17, 1996, § 1 at 33.
80. Id.; see generally Shirley E. Perlman, et. al, District Attorneys Face a Difficult
Decision: Life or Death, NEwsDAY, Mar. 31, 1998, at A7.
81. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
(1985).

1996]

FEDERALIZING DEATH

337

penalty's advocates will be left in charge of making it become real.
In the last analysis, therefore, what the new federal capital
punishment law may actually represent is a unique law-and-order,
libertarian, law-and-economics three-fer: a death penalty; a nod toward conscientious individualism; and a lovely, morally frictionless
efficiency of application, too.

